Although much research has been done on advertising in American political campaigns, virtually all has focused on the use of television. The dearth of work on radio advertising limits our ability to fully understand American electoral dynamics. More campaigns use radio than television, and there is reason to suspect that the narrowcasting that is possible with highly targeted radio ads may be substantively different from the campaign messages that are broadcast over the television airwaves. In this article, we use data from a survey of registered voters in Arkansas and Missouri during the 2002 election season to explore the dynamics of political advertising on the radio. We focus in particular on factors that influence exposure to radio ads, the public's perceptions of the importance of these ads, and the impacts of exposure on the public's perceptions of the quality of the democratic process in the United States.
almost 650,000 residents, politicians for federal offices-and, increasingly, those for state and local offices as well-have relied on the various media to relay their campaign messages to potential voters. Given the ubiquity of television in American life, it is not surprising that most of the research on the uses and effects of campaign advertising has focused on television, to the virtual exclusion of other important media. This seems particularly unfortunate in the case of radio. Although radio employs older, lower-level, less glamorous technology, it remains a ubiquitous media presence in American life, including political campaigns at virtually every level of the governmental spectrum.
In this article, we offer some tentative empirical analyses of this overlooked campaign medium, focusing on preliminary questions related to issues of exposure to radio campaign advertisements and patterns in public perceptions of the importance of the campaign information they receive via the radio airwaves. As we begin, we offer two basic justifications for focusing on radio. First, and most generally, as Geer and Geer (2003) have pointedly observed, "We are a multimedia society" (p. 84). Studies of campaign advertising that are limited to examination of television commercials implicitly ignore this basic cultural fact about America. Here we take some preliminary steps toward answering the challenge laid down by Geer and Geer "to broaden our knowledge of the impact of political ads beyond television" (p. 69). Second, there is reason to believe that radio advertising may be qualitatively different from campaign advertisement via television. Because radio allows a far more nuanced targeting of audiences-what is best described as narrowcasting-its use and effects as a political campaigning tool are potentially different from those chronicled in studies of television broadcasting, raising both interesting empirical questions about the strategic utilization of radio advertising and important normative questions about its impact on the quality of American politics.
Although we cannot answer such questions fully in this article, we do begin to offer some exploratory analyses of these issues. Many pundits and a handful of scholars have speculated about the role of radio in modern political campaigns, but no study of which we are aware has considered the matter in a systematic fashion, surveying broadly the important issues at stake. In the sections that follow, we begin by outlining some basic facts about radio usage in modern American political campaigns, emphasizing the persistence of this medium even in the "age of television." We then summarize the limited scholarly literature on the political implications of radio and present a framework for analyzing the medium's role in political campaigns. Then, utilizing data from a survey of registered voters in Arkansas and Missouri during the 2002 campaign season, we examine patterns in the public's exposure to campaign advertisements on the radio, the importance of these ads to arriving at voting decisions, and the impact of radio exposure on various public attitudes related to campaigns and elections. In a concluding section, we summarize our findings, speculate on their broader significance, and echo Geer and Geer's (2003) call for more research on campaign media usage beyond television.
The Persistence of Radio Advertising
Many general texts on American political campaigns make no mention of radio advertising at all; those that do usually mention radio only in passing. In his book on congressional elections, for instance, Herrnson (2000) says little about the impact of radio advertising beyond that it is "ideal for building a candidate's name identification " (p. 210 ). Yet a number of political participants and observers have noticed both resurgence in the use of radio for political advertising during the past decade and that radio ads are qualitatively different from those that campaigns run on television. Dobrez (1996) characterizes the revival in campaign uses of radio as "meteoric" and traces this phenomenon to the 1992 Clinton-Gore presidential campaign (see also Viles, 1992) . He notes that although Clinton-Gore 1992 has become legendary for the free television exposure it garnered on outlets such as MTV and the Arsenio Hall Show, "the real secret weapon of that campaign might have been . . . radio" (p. 39).
Radio's role in recent presidential campaigns has been noted by practitioners of politics at that level. But, just as clearly, radio advertising remains a vital component of campaigns for candidates throughout the country and at all levels of the political ambition ladder. Its continuing role in congressional campaigns can be seen in campaign spending patterns. As Herrnson (2000) notes, a larger percentage of U.S. Senate and House candidates use radio than television advertising, with in excess of 90% of House candidates and almost every Senate candidate utilizing radio (p. 210). This contrasts with the 70% of House candidates who make use of more costly (in some cases, prohibitively costly) television advertisements and the approximately 90% of Senate candidates who do so (p. 205). Examination of campaign expenditure data for races further down the political ambition ladder shows that radio advertising becomes even more predominant.
Because many analyses of campaign advertising focus on aggregate spending patterns, they are prone to overlook the importance of radio precisely because it is such an inexpensive medium, whose impact is likely to be much larger than its percentage of a campaign budget would suggest. The 2002 campaign cycle in Arkansas provides an excellent example of how misleading reliance on aggregate spending figures can be. During the 2002 campaign season, candidates, parties, and unaffiliated groups spent nearly $8 million total in the Little Rock media market. Although less than 2.5% of that went for radio ads, because of the expense of television versus the economical nature of radio, these radio ads accounted for nearly 20% of all ads that were aired in Little Rock (2,752 of 14,300). But even that does not do full justice to the impact of radio. Because radio air time is so inexpensive (with some spots costing as little as $15), radio spots were commonly 60 seconds, double that of the vast majority of 30-second TV spots (Barth & Parry, 2003) . Thus, even the 20% figure is a clear underestimate of the amount of paid campaign communication minutes that occurred on radio.
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The assertion (common in the media) that radio ads are qualitatively different is based on several premises. First, because of market segmentation, radio allows for a far better targeting of particular audiences than does television, particularly network television.
2 This is also recognized in the political world. Although we will return to this point in more detail below, it is worth citing this observation from Democratic media consultants Don Sweitzer and Dave Heller (1996) : Unlike television, [radio] is driven by format, not by program. That means listeners are likely to be loyal to the same one or two stations most of the day, whereas few television viewers ever are loyal to, say, just NBC. (p. 40) Reportage from recent presidential campaigns provides at least anecdotal evidence that campaigns take advantage of these listening habits to focus particular messages toward particular groups. Viles (1992) , for instance, quotes Mandy Grunwald (director of advertising for the Clinton-Gore campaign) to the effect that "'we [used] radio extensively to target geographically and to target demographically'" (p. 26).
3 In addition, radio formats are not only ultrasegmented, they are also largely nonoverlapping. Politically, this means "fragmentation allows candidates to send a radio message to one demographic group that they would not want another group to overhear" (Kolbert, 1992, p. A15 ; see also Wayne, 1996) .
The sheer number of radio stations makes it difficult for anyone to track all the ads a campaign may run. Although campaigns carefully monitor the opposition's televised ads, radio ad campaigns are more difficult to patrol: "Just as low-flying planes avoid radar, radio commercials are often able to escape detection" (Kolbert, 1992, p. A15) . According to some observers, such factors make radio the medium of choice for the most aggressive and misleading commercials in a campaign's advertising arsenal (Jamieson, cited in Kolbert, 1992) . Technology may also contribute to this disparity. As VCRs and DVRs have become more common-allowing for campaigns to record the opposition's television ads with ease-tape recorders have become less so, making it more likely that radio ads will go unnoticed and unanswered by the opposition.
Although many of these claims seem credible, they have not been explored in depth or in a systematic fashion. Most of what we know about the resurgence of radio as a campaign medium is based on the observations of partisan participants and lacks much in the way of theoretical grounding or comprehensive perspective. Moreover, because most of this commentary comes from presidential races, we have little idea about whether the patterns of radio usage described in national campaigns can be generalized to races for other, lower political offices. These observations do, however, provide points of departure for our analysis after overviewing the limited research that has been done on radio in American politics.
Previous Literature on Political Uses of Radio
Although the literature on political advertising on television is voluminous, 4 scholars have paid far less attention to radio. Political communications scholars have "followed the money" in focusing their work on television. But this is one instance where the money trail has caused researchers to miss a vibrant area of activity in American political communication. Moreover, because radio advertising is structurally different from television, an awareness of its continuing role in the American electoral process leads to a series of questions that research completed on other forms of political communication cannot be assumed to answer.
Most of the literature on the politically relevant aspects of radio has focused on political talk radio (PTR), much of it directly responsive to the emergence of Rush Limbaugh as a national figure in the 1990s (for a summary, see Cappella, Turow, & Jamieson, 1996) . Many of the studies of PTR have found it to have significant influence on public opinion, candidate perception, and policy outcomes (e.g., Barker, 1998 Barker, , 1999 Barker & Knight, 2000; Hofstetter et al., 1994; Hollander, 1996; Lee & Cappella, 2001; Pfau, Cho, & Chong, 2001 ). For example, Barker (1999) and Pfau et al. (2001) have linked exposure to conservative programming on PTR to listener preference for GOP candidates in the 1996 and 2000 election cycles, respectively.
5 Other scholars have reported more ambiguous findings related to the effects of PTR. Examining the 1996 Republican primaries, Jones (1998) , for instance, concludes that "despite weeks of listening to Limbaugh criticize Pat Buchanan, members of the audience were no more likely to harbor negative feelings toward the candidate than were nonlisteners" (p. 367), suggesting "apparent limits to the power of Limbaugh's cues" (p. 377). More generally, several studies (e.g., Hofstetter, 1998; Owen, 1997) have reported only modest effects from PTR once controls are added for respondents' demographic characteristics, prior political and ideological orientations, and exposure to other media.
Despite this ongoing debate about the potency of PTR as a political force, it leaves little doubt that radio can be a politically important medium. This makes even more interesting the fact that beyond PTR, there has been extremely limited scholarly analysis of the political uses of radio. Among the few empirical studies of political advertising on the radio, most focus on some matter other than the medium in use. Shapiro and Reiger (1992) , for instance, examined variation in listener responses to positive and negative political ads on the radio, finding evidence of better retention of information in negative ads but also some backlash against their sponsors. In this study, however, radio was treated simply as the medium for the delivery of the message; the authors offer no analysis of radio's unique features relative to television. Noting the paucity of research in this area, Geer and Geer (2003) display an interest in radio per se. They argue that political radio advertising deserves our attention because of its importance in subnational elections and the likelihood that its usage will grow because of its cost-effectiveness vis-à-vis television, largely because candidates are able to target critical blocks of voters without wasting resources on those residing outside of their districts (pp. 70-71) . But the focus of their work, too, is fundamentally on the differences between citizen responses to positive versus attack ads; as they acknowledge, they "only scratch the surface" of important issues related to the medium itself.
The only study of which we are aware that specifically focuses on the electoral impact of radio campaigns ads is McCleneghan (1987) . Quite limited in scope, this study examines the importance of radio advertisements to the outcomes of 11 mayoral elections in New Mexico during 1986. McCleneghan reports that candidates' use of radio ads was the single most important predictor of victory, outstripping the effects of spending, newspaper endorsements, press coverage, incumbency, economic factors, and campaign ads in newspapers.
Narrowcast Communications: A Democratizing or Balkanizing Force?
Undeniably, television advertising can be targeted to subgroups of voters with some success, particularly on some cable stations with narrower audiences than networks. Even on network stations, the audiences of particular shows may be skewed toward certain subgroups (i.e., women or men or racial/ethnic groups). But the segmentation on television does not match that of radio formatting. Although definitions and counts vary, most agree there are at least four dozen different formats (ranging from Black Gospel to Americana) to be found among the approximately 13,000 commercial radio stations in the country. 6 The profiles of radio stations' audiences are shaped by the format of the station and can be confirmed through accurate ratings data.
7 A recent study showed that Americans are very loyal to particular stations, on average listening to just 1.7 radio stations, usually selected on the basis of that station's music format.
8 Such information opens an effective narrowcasting option not found as easily with other political media. Especially on television, where channel loyalty is very low (McGrath, 1998) , and one study estimated that the average viewer changed channels once every 3 minutes and 42 seconds (see http://www.trinity.edu/~mkearl/remotetv.html), it can be very difficult to target particular demographic segments of the population. Moreover, the production of television advertisements (for broadcast on either network or cable) has inherent costs that often make targeting advertisements to particular audiences cost-prohibitive.
Evidence from the U.S. Senate campaign in Arkansas during the 2002 cycle shows that campaign managers consciously targeted radio spending as part of their basic campaign communication gameplan. 9 Interviews with Democratic campaign and party operatives found they planned to spend $450,000 on radio advertising and to concentrate this spending on "Black" stations, with only one third going toward stations with predominantly White audiences. Late in the campaign, additional money was pumped to radio stations with predominantly White male listeners to allow a focus on the candidate's stance on gun rights and flag desecration (M. Cook, personal communication, November 19, 2002; P. Johnson, personal communication, November 18, 2002) . On the other side, GOP campaign strategists concentrated their radio spending on stations with news or talk formats and especially those with White Christian audiences (R. Bearden, personal communication, November 13, 2002) . 10 The only GOP-oriented radio ads run on urban, African American stations were produced by an out-of-state political group, Council for a Better Government.
11 Interviews with campaign operatives in Missouri confirm similar use of radio to target subgroups of voters in that state as well.
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The segmentation of its markets raises a fundamental normative question about radio's use as a political campaign medium. Television advertising, especially on network stations, must focus on issues of importance to large swaths of voters and must use modes of communication that will resonate with the mass of voters while not alienating other potentially important voting blocks, essentially attempting to appeal to both core constituencies and swing voters in the middle of the electorate in a single advertisement. The niche nature of radio formats presents other opportunities for campaigns. On radio, subgroups of citizens often not reached by mainstream media can be communicated with on their own terms, with a focus on political issues that are of vital interest to them (usually in a longer format that allows greater depth to the presentation).
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This notion has its roots in the uses and gratification approach, grounded in social psychology and applied commonly in media research. Rather than envisaging media outlets' interactions with media consumers as flowing in one direction, Katz (1959) and Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch (1974) argue that the active role of consumers in selecting their media sources is crucial to understanding media usage and effects. Specifically, proponents of the uses and gratifications approach argue that different individuals are drawn to different media sources because of their own individualized psychological and social needs: information, social interaction, and enhancement of personal identity, among others (for different, overlapping categorizations of needs, see Katz, Gurevitch, & Haas, 1973; McQuail, 1987; Severin & Tankard, 1997) . With radio, individuals from groups not communicated with directly on mainstream (i.e., White and secular) media outlets may gain gratification from a radio format narrowcast to their group.
14 Similarly, particularly mobile individuals (e.g., the young) may find radio the most accessible media providing political information. Thus, there is the potential for a significant democratization effect by radio advertising if groups who do not find television advertising psychologically accessible are a disproportionate target of radio advertising.
certain subgroups, that communication may be disproportionately focused on emphasizing differences between those groups and selected "out" groups. The nonvisual nature of radio may be particularly effective in the stealth activation of negative stereotypes about out-groups. 16 Thus, rather than democratizing American politics, radio may be a force for further balkanization of American society. 17 The content of some of the radio ads in the campaigns we focus on in this study strongly suggests this possibility.
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After outlining our data and method and exploring some of the basic dynamics of exposure to radio campaign ads in 2002, we take some initial cuts at this normative question. Our findings, although far from dispositive, do provide at least some reasons to be optimistic about the role of radio advertising in contemporary campaigns.
Data and Method
Our data come from a three-wave panel survey conducted by the Center for the Study of Elections and Democracy (CSED) at Brigham Young University during the 2002 midterm election campaign. The full study included nearly 12,000 interviews with some 6,500 survey respondents. The study focused on competitive campaigns in four states: Senate campaigns in Arkansas and Missouri and House campaigns in the Fifth District of Connecticut and the Seventh District of Colorado. 19 The study also included a national sample as a baseline. 20 We use data from the Arkansas and Missouri portions of the study, particularly data from the third wave, which was fielded on the nights of November 5, 6, and 7 (election night and the two subsequent nights). 21 Our analyses are based on the 500 respondents in Arkansas and the 501 respondents in Missouri who completed all three stages of the survey. The CSED data are virtually unique in the wide range of media sources covered. Unlike most surveys (e.g., the National Election Study), which ask questions only related to television exposure, the CSED queried respondents on their exposure to a broad range of campaign media in addition to television, including radio, the Internet, mailings, newspaper, and personal candidate contact.
In this article, we focus on issues related to exposure to campaign ads on the radio, the perceived importance of information received through radio ads, and any influence such exposure has on public attitudes toward government, public trust, and campaigns. We do so with an eye toward gaining insight into the normative questions at play in the balkanizing-democratizing dichotomy noted above.
In our first cut at the data, we look at simple exposure to radio and television ads. Our measure of exposure to campaign radio advertisements is calculated from the question in each wave that asked respondents, "On an average day this past week, how many radio ads about the U.S. Senate race did you hear?" To most fully capture the impact of communication via the media format across the entirety of the campaign, we summed responses across waves and recalculated missing data to the variable mean. For comparison, we calculated a similar summary measure for exposure to television ads. It is crucial to note here that although the data set we employ has crucially important advantages over other surveys that include more blunt questions about campaign communications received or ask only questions about television advertisements, it is still reliant on voters' self-estimation of the number of ads that they saw, heard, or read. Scholars (see, in particular, Ansolabehere, Iyengar, & Simon, 1999) have made a clear case that respondent recall does not provide a completely accurate measure of exposure to media events such as advertisements. Like all researchers relying on recall data for our measures, we need to be aware of the danger therein, but we suspect that the breaking of advertisements into several different categories and using a cumulative measure of advertisements heard at three different points during the campaign likely enhances respondents' reliability significantly. Table 1 includes a number of descriptive statistics for our measures of cumulative exposure to radio and television ads during the course of the campaign. Several things are immediately obvious from this table. First, respondents report greater exposure to television ads, with a mean almost three times as large as that for radio and a median almost five times as large. 22 Still, almost 80% of respondents report hearing at least one radio ad, with a range of up to 130 total radio ads reported. It is possible that levels of exposure to both radio and television campaign ads covary closely with each other, with the same "high information voters" watching numerous television ads and listening to numerous radio ads. Although there is a positive relationship between exposure to radio ads and exposure to television ads, the correlation is not particularly strong (r = .22), leading us to believe that these different media reach different segments of the public.
Who Uses Radio Advertising?
Are there differences in the factors that lead people to be exposed to radio as opposed to television ads? If the basic contention that radio is indeed a more narrowcast medium is accurate, then such patterns should show themselves.
To address this question, we constructed multivariate models for each medium, regressing cumulative ad exposure in each case on 11 independent variables representing a potent array of demographic and political predictors: partisan identification (ranked along a standard 7-point scale from strong Democrat to strong Republican), gender (coded 0 for females, 1 for males), religiosity (based on self-reported frequency of church attendance, ranging from "more than once a week" to "never," with higher codes reflecting more secular behavior), age, education (based on last year of formal education and arranged on an 8-point scale from no high school diploma to postdoctoral work), the presence of children younger than 18 in the household (with respondents from households without children coded 0, those with children coded 1), 2001 household income, home ownership (with homeowners coded 1, all others coded 0), and race (with self-identified Caucasians coded 0, all others coded 1). In addition, a scale of political efficacy (ranging from a low of 3 to a high of 15, with higher scores indicating greater feelings of political efficacy) 23 and self-reported interest in the campaign (ranging from "very much interested" to "not at all interested") are included as controls because those most interested in the campaign and those who are most efficacious are likely heavy users of all political media. To reduce endogeneity concerns, all of these variables were calculated from responses given to questions in the first wave of the survey.
Results for these regressions are summarized in Table 2 . Although the equation for radio does a reasonably good job of explaining variance in exposure (adjusted R 2 = .09), the one for television does not. 24 Not a single one of the independent variables emerges as significant (indeed, most of the coefficients they generate are not nearly as large as their standard errors), and the adjusted R 2 is anemic. In the radio equation, a number of independent variables emerge as significant. Partisanship is related to exposure to radio ads, with Republicans reporting higher levels of exposure than similarly situated Democrats.
Ceteris paribus, gender and age are also robustly related to radio exposure, with men and younger respondents reporting hearing more ads. The former finding affirms what an advertising observer noted during the 2004 campaign cycle: "The broadcast TV audience is getting . . . skewed toward women over the last 10 years. To reach a more male audience, [advertisers] need to go outside broadcast TV to a more format-driven medium" (Parmley, 2004 ; see also Reynolds, 2004) .
The presence of children in the household increases radio advertisement exposure, whereas it has no discernible impact on television. Finally, education and feelings of political efficacy seem to have at least modest impacts (significant at the .10 threshold), in each instance tamping down exposure to radio campaign ads.
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Because this is largely exploratory work, we will make no claim here that these models represent best fits or even the most theoretically justifiable of specifications. Rather, we are content for the time being to show that exposure to campaign advertisements on the radio is substantially different from television exposure. This difference highlights the distinctive nature of radio versus television advertising. TV ads are broadcast and ubiquitous; virtually everyone sees them, with differences in levels of exposure basically idiosyncratic. On the other hand, radio ads are narrowcast, targeted toward particular audiences with distinguishing characteristics.
The Value of Political Information Via Radio Advertising
We now turn to the more important question of the value that the target audiences attach to the information they receive via radio during campaigns. Uses and gratifications theory would clearly suggest that citizens make use of specific types of political media because they receive some value from them. And, we hypothesize that members of traditional social and political "outsider" groups who are overlooked in mainstream broadcast communications and individuals who may typically be difficult to communicate with in campaigns because of their lack of social stability (e.g., the young) are more likely to "use" this narrowcast medium during campaigns because it has value to them in the making of vote decisions.
Our measure of media importance is generated from a question in the third wave of the survey that queried respondents about the utility of information received through various media sources. 27 Because the question tapping this issue provided respondents with five ordered categories for their responses, ranging from very important (1) to not at all important (4) to no information received via this medium (5), we use an ordered logistic regression estimation technique to assess the factors that correlate with these answers.
The measures of political efficacy and interest in the campaign are added as control variables, as is a self-report of whether or not the individual voted in the election (coded 1 for yes and 0 for no), another gauge of the person's level of interest in this particular campaign. Separate models for radio advertisements and television advertisements are summarized in Table 3 .
Once again, even a brief perusal of the table substantiates the proposition that radio ads are substantially different from television ads. In the radio model, six of our independent variables are robustly significant. Among the more intriguing findings are the facts that men are significantly more likely to find radio ads important than are women, and more religiously active citizens rely significantly more on radio ads for campaign information than do otherwise similarly situated secular citizens.
28 Age is also an interesting correlate of perceived radio importance; although younger Americans are typically thought of as a "video generation," they report a greater impact from radio ads than do older Americans, and there is no similar age effect visible in the television model. 29 Race is important in both models, with Caucasians reporting less influence from both radio and television ads than do non-Caucasians. 30 We will return to this point in some depth later, but it is worth noting at this juncture that many of those who report receiving more politically important information from radio ads-religious individuals, younger citizens, and racial minorities-are members of groups often considered to be underrepresented in (or even excluded from) most mainstream political communications in America. This not only comports well with the expectations generated by uses and gratification theory, it also provides some hints of a democratizing effect of radio advertising in U.S. campaigns.
One final matter from Table 3 deserves our attention. Although cumulative exposure to television ads is statistically unrelated to the perceived importance of the information received in these ads, the relationship for radio ads is robustly significant. The more respondents were exposed to campaign ads on the radio, the more importance they attached to the information they received from such ads. There are several ways to interpret this result, but two strike us as perhaps the most intuitive. First, it is quite possible that radio ads really do impart more information. As noted above, the relatively low cost of radio ads means that they tend to be longer (often 60 seconds in length) than are television ads. 31 Second, the segmented nature of radio listening patterns means that radio listeners tend not to hear competing, conflicting ads. Rather than canceling each other out as television ads often do (when pro-and anti-ads sometimes run literally back to back on network affiliates), ads on particular radio stations with specific formats tend to be for one candidate or the other, but not for both.
32 Also, the relatively low cost of radio air time allows for greater repetition of ads, whereas lower production costs allows for them to be delivered by messengers who would be perceived by listeners as similar to themselves and, therefore, as attractive and credible (Eagly & Chaiken, 1975; Wachtler & Counselman, 1981) . A plausible implication of this line of reasoning is that additional marginal campaign funds spent on television ads actually buy rather little in terms of impact on voters because (at least in competitive races) these broadcast ads fight largely to a draw in the public's perceptions. But marginal dollars spent on ads narrowcast on radio buy substantially more because their cumulative effect increases public belief in the importance of the information they contain. Again, this is broadly consonant with uses and gratification theory, implying as it does that citizens place greater value on campaign advertisements that appear in media formats that permit greater tailoring of messages to specific psychological needs.
Does Radio Advertising Make Democracy Healthier?
Finally, in a first pass at the broader issue of radio's impact on democracy introduced earlier, our data allow us to examine what effects, if any, exposure to campaign radio ads has on some basic citizen attitudes. We include two measures to tap political alienation, both taken from questions asked in the third wave of the survey. The first is a standard trust in government question, worded, "How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right? Just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?" The second is a more general question about the quality of democracy in America: "On the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the United States? Are you very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied?" Higher codings reflect greater distrust or cynicism.
Finally, we use a question related to public perceptions of the quality of the Senate campaigns in the two states. The question focused on the tone of the campaigns: "Do you believe the campaign for U.S. Senate this year was more negative, less negative, or about the same compared to other recent political contests?" Those who answered either more or less negative were then queried about whether the change was "a lot" or "a little," which allowed us to create a 5-point measure running from "a lot more negative" to "a lot less negative."
Here our focus is entirely on the role that radio and television advertising have on views of democracy. A host of other demographic and political variables are included as controls, several of which have been shown to be relevant in shaping media use, and others (e.g., economic standing) that have long been shown to be forces in shaping individuals' views of how well democracy is working. Political efficacy and turnout measures are also included as important controls. Results from these ordered logistic regression equations are summarized in Table 4 .
Once again, we see very different patterns in the effects of television and radio exposure (as can be seen in the impacts of the last two variables in each model in Table 4) . 33 Controlling for the other factors, exposure to more campaign ads on television is associated with more negative assessments of the tone of the Senate campaign (p ≤ .038), whereas no similar effect is seen for exposure to radio ads (p ≤ .981).
34 Similarly, there is at least a modestly significant relationship between exposure to television ads and lower trust in government to "do what is right" (p ≤ .118), but there is no analogous effect for radio ads (p ≤ .840). On the other hand, exposure to radio ads emerges as a significant predictor of faith in democracy in the third equation in Table 4 , with respondents who reported hearing more campaign ads on the radio evincing greater satisfaction with the way democracy works in the United States. Interestingly, although the coefficient for the television advertisement variable does not rise to conventional levels of statistical significance (p ≤ .302), it is signed in the opposite direction, indicating that if there is any television effect it probably works in an unhealthy manner, with more exposure to television campaign ads eroding confidence in the democratic process.
Summary, Discussion, and Conclusions
In this article, we have outlined the first comprehensive assessment of radio campaign advertising, accounting for a very common, yet overlooked, medium through which candidates talk to voters. Using survey data from two states with competitive Senate races in 2002, we have explored patterns in the public's exposure to radio ads, perceptions of the importance of these ads, and the effects of exposure on citizen attitudes about the democratic process.
Several of our findings bear reiteration here. First, there are important differences in the public's exposure to radio as opposed to television campaign ads. Exposure to TV ads is more widespread and, because they are broadcast, more ubiquitous, with variation in exposure a function of idiosyncratic factors that are difficult to model with available data. Radio ads, conversely, are narrowcast to particular audiences. Although the general public may have less exposure to radio than to television ads, the patterns are tractable, with younger citizens, males, those with children, and Republicans reporting higher levels of exposure. Second, and in accordance with uses and gratifications theory, there are significant differences in the perceived importance of radio versus television ads. Males, younger people, and more religious citizens are significantly more likely to report that radio (but not television) ads were important to their voting decisions; compared to Whites and the better educated, African Americans and the less well educated report that both radio and television ads were important, although in both cases the effect was stronger in the radio equations. These differential response patterns are, again, consistent with the narrower targeting possible on radio. Also noteworthy was that exposure to more radio ads was robustly related to viewing them as important sources of information, which was certainly not the case with television ads. Third, exposure to radio and television ads seems to have very different impacts on citizen attitudes about and orientation to the political process. In general, more exposure to television has a net negative effect, with those who see more TV ads also reporting significantly more negative assessments of the 2002 political campaigns and-if anything-a modestly higher level of distrust in government. In contrast, greater exposure to radio ads is strongly associated with a more optimistic assessment of the manner in which democracy operates in the American context. Given the aggressive nature of some radio ads, this might strike some as surprising, yet it fits nicely within our model of radio ads targeting otherwise largely excluded groups, addressing an issue they find important with speakers they find attractive.
What general conclusions can we draw from these findings? We believe there are several. First, they warrant an echoing of Geer and Geer's (2003) call for an expansion of political communication research beyond its current, virtually exclusive focus on television. As we have shown, radio usage both is very common in American political campaigns and involves fundamentally different dynamics than those found in television. 36 Scholars of political campaigns and political communications need to take these differences seriously and turn some of their attention to exploring the dynamics of media beyond television. Future research on radio in particular might benefit from more thoroughly exploring the theoretical matters that are merely scratched in this study, expanding the scope of enquiry to empirically examine the use of radio ads in campaigns at other levels and more assiduously collecting radio ads and mapping how different ads are used to target particular demographic audiences.
Second, we can provide at least a preliminary answer to the balkanization versus democratization dichotomy we advanced earlier. Although we think that the narrowcasting possible on radio permits both, 37 in the aggregate we found more evidence that radio ads enhance the democratic experience rather than detract from it. 38 Our data indicate that groups often marginalized in the American political dialogue (the young, the more religious, the less educated, racial minorities) are more likely to report receiving important political information via radio. This point is strengthened by our finding that greater exposure to radio ads is associated with more sanguine evaluations of democracy. As noted above, the segmented nature of the radio market permits a level of political dialogue that speaks to very particular audiences about topics of specific interest and delivers these messages in language that particular listeners finds attractive and accessible; our data indicate that this has salubrious effects on general citizen attitudes.
Third, this in turn may tell us something more fundamental about the American public and its orientation to politics. The broadcast airwaves are crowded and messy. Network television affiliates regularly run numerous, competing, conflicting ads; it is not unusual for back-to-back TV ads to make diametrically opposing claims about policies and/or politicians. Our data suggest that such a spirited, public, contentious debate on the airwaves is not much appreciated by the citizenry. Rather, it would seem that the public interprets such democratic give and take as untidy, muddled, chaotic, and confusing, leaving those who are more exposed to it with more negative assessments about the process and less trust in government (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002) . Americans, it would seem, really do not want to hear all sides of an issue.
The public-or at least good swaths of it-actually seems to prefer narrowcast messages, customized for them, spoken to them, focused on the issues that are most salient to their social and/or cultural community, and unadulterated by (or, at least, less adulterated by) competing claims. This will certainly discomfort those who believe that democracy requires open dialogue among citizens with different, competing perspectives. But such an idealized conception of democracy-with its sharply competing messages, open struggle for control of the public agenda, and inevitable compromise-may be far more attractive to pundits and philosophers than it is to rank-and-file citizens (Hibbing, 2002) . In practice, as Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002) have shown, Americans seem to prefer political processes that display less of the messy, conflictual give and take that is often associated with vibrant democratic exchange. Although some will find this unsettling, our results are certainly in line with those of Hibbing and Theiss-Morse. They suggest that less broadcasting and more narrowcasting, less public debate and more targeted discussions, less shared dialogue and more tailored discourse may, in fact and counterintuitively, be what the public desires and contribute to a more engaged citizenry that displays more positive, system-supporting attitudes.
Notes
1. These numbers are consistent with marketing research results from around the world that have found that radio can be a considerably more efficient and cost-effective method of advertising than television in the selling of products (see the industry studies cited in Peacock, 2002, including Gibbe; Ingram & Cory; and Paskowitz & Bennett) .
2. This rises well beyond the level of conventional wisdom in the media marketing literature. In his handbook on radio advertising, Schulberg (1989) notes that "mass marketing is declining in America. Segmented marketing is accelerating" (p. 67). Similarly, in their work on trends in radio advertising, Herweg and Herweg (1997) estimate that in the mid-1990s only 8% of companies in the developed world engaged in "niche marketing," but they predicted that by the end of the first decade of the 21st century, 80% would.
3. Viles (1992) also quoted sources in the radio industry that Ross Perot's campaign tended to buy ads on "country, adult contemporary, middle-of-the-road and news stations," whereas the Clinton-Gore campaign focused on "urban and black-oriented stations" (p. 26). See also examples cited in Dobrez (1996) . On the Bush campaign's use of radio (and cable television) in 2004, see Parmley (2004) .
4. For recent summaries of this literature, see Hart and Shaw (2001) , Kaid and Johnston (2000) , Thurber, Nelson, and Dulio (2000) , and West (1993) .
5. Although disentangling endogeneity issues is a major concern in this literature, the panel study employed by Barker (1999) provides some of the best evidence that listening to political talk radio (PTR) affects ideology. Although the causal evidence is not conclusive, as Barker argues, "assumptions about listening being nothing more than a function of ideology are likely mistaken" (p. 536).
6. Nationally, the most popular formats in order are country, news or talk, adult contemporary, Christian, and oldies. The TVRadioWorld (http://www.tvradioworld.com) description of one format gives a flavor for the specificity of the audiences drawn to particular formats: "Oldies-espanol" is "popular in markets with large Hispanic communities" and "concentrates on popular Spanish language oldies hits of the 50's, 60's, and 70's." 7. Interested readers may consult the Arbitron Web site (http://wargod.arbitron.com/ scripts/ndb/audience2.asp) for a full list of audience age and gender characteristics for the 56 different station formats tracked by that ratings company. The differences between radio and television are underscored by recent Arbitron and Neilsen ratings for the Little Rock media market. Although neither corporation public reports full demographic data, the targeting potential for radio is evidenced from examining recent ratings for women and men in the 25 to 54 age group, the only age group where gender differences are reported. The top-rated radio station among men of the age group in the market is a "talk/personality" station; it fails to show up in the top 10 stations for women of the same age range. Although the top-ranked station for women-a country station-comes in tied for third among men, on a typical quarter hour nearly twice as many women (about 3,000) as men (about 1,700) are listening to the station. Conversely, in the same age and gender group in the Nielsen ratings, only minimal differences show themselves between women and men in the viewing of the 6:00 television news programs during and around which many political advertisements are shown. The top-rated station's news program draws 21.4% of the men and 20.5% of the women viewing television in the market that day; for the second-rated station, the comparable figures are 17.0% of women and 15.0% of men.
8. The American Radio News Audience Survey, which is available online at http://www.rtnda.or/radio/mix/.
9. Although we think it prudent not to overgeneralize from two cases, we suspect that similar dynamics are at work in many American political campaigns. Indeed, interview evidence from these two campaigns (cited below) largely reflects published reports from recent presidential campaigns (cited above).
10. Bearden noted that the Hutchinson campaign also directed some radio ads toward Spanish-language stations serving the immigrant population in northwest Arkansas. Interestingly, Democratic strategist Paul Johnson explicitly noted that the Pryor campaign did not target the large number of Christian-oriented stations.
11. The ads, using distinctly African American voices, used text such as references to "our community" to reinforce their targeted nature. For example, one ad voiced by an African American woman included this segment:
Today, one third of African American pregnancies end in abortion. Black babies are terminated at triple the rate of white babies. Although under Title X, schools can counsel scared kids to abort their babies without even consulting their parents. Each year the abortion mills diminish the human capital of our community by another 400,000 souls. The Democrat Party supports these liberal laws that are decimating our people. But the individual's right to life is protected in the Republican platform. Democrats say they want our vote, why don't they say they want our lives?
Overby, Barth / Radio Advertising 471 See Nelson (2002) . For an account of a similar campaign in Missouri, which was pulled after it caused a regional controversy, see Judis (2002) .
12. One former congressional candidate in Missouri emphasized that urban radio is a more effective method for targeting African Americans than is direct mail. Although movement of African American families to the suburbs and the "gentrification" of inner-city neighborhoods by Caucasian yuppies render targeting voters by zip codes more difficult, African Americans continue to tune into urban Black radio stations even when they have White neighbors.
13. Consider the following two ads produced by the Reform Voter Project in opposition to the reelection of incumbent Senator Tim Hutchinson. The 30-second television ad was titled "What Did it Buy": Big corporate special interests have invested over $4 million dollars in Tim Hutchinson's campaigns. What did it buy? Many of the same corporations have lobbied for years against raising the minimum wage. What did it buy? And seven times in the last six years, Tim Hutchinson has voted against raising the minimum wage. So ask Tim Hutchinson: What did it buy? And then tell him, it's time to clean up politics.
Although there were some visual images in the television spot that supplemented the spoken word (e.g., on-screen citations to the specific minimum wage votes), the amount of specific information in the advertisement is limited. There was, for instance, no mention of specific corporations or specific contributions. In contrast, this is a transcript of the 60-second advertisement, titled "Summertime," aired by the same group on radio stations:
It's summertime. Long lazy days, backyard cookouts, and big juicy burgers hot off the grill. But before you bite into that burger, are you sure it is safe to eat? This month, hamburger tainted with e coli, made 19 people sick. And the Centers for Disease Control reports contaminated food sends over 300,000 Americans to the hospital every year. So why did Senator Tim Hutchinson vote against more food safety inspections? And why did Hutchinson cast the deciding vote against closing dirty food processing plants? Maybe it's because Tim Hutchinson took more than $264,000 from big food processors-including more from the meat industry than any other Senator this election. Tim Hutchinson even took $10,000 from ConAgra-the company whose hamburger meat was recalled because it made so many people ill this month. Special interest money in politics. Tell Tim Hutchinson. It's enough to make you sick. Paid for by Reform Voter Project, on the web at reformvoter.org.
With its more specific dollar figures, mention of a particular corporate donor, and allegation that Hutchinson cast the deciding vote regarding closing food processing plants, this ad-in comparison to the television ad-provides considerably more detailed information to substantiate the charges leveled at the candidate.
14. A recent survey-based study by the Radio Ad Effectiveness Laboratory ("Personal Relevance, Personal Connections: How Radio Ads Affect Consumers," available online at http://radioadlab.org) makes this point explicitly:
Listeners believe that both the medium [radio] and its advertising are more relevant to them (compared to television and newspapers). . . . Consumers view television and newspapers as being designed to satisfy the masses, but radio is where they turn to get gratification of their personal wants and needs.
15. McQuail (1987) emphasizes that social circumstances constrain the choices people make in terms of media sources and also notes the role of habit in shaping patterns of media usage, but he reiterates the options available to consumers and the role of psychological forces in shaping those choices.
16. Jamieson (quoted in Kolbert, 1992) has speculated, in addition, that radio advertising operates differently "'since the information [presented in radio ads] doesn't stay tied to its source, like it does with television'" (p. A15), raising the possibility that candidates could target particularly inflammatory ads at certain demographic groups without themselves being tarred by the raising of such charges.
17. Although it would not be as relevant in the more rural states (especially Arkansas) that are the focus of our analysis, some also emphasize the context in which people listen to radio (i.e., primarily in their cars). Sweitzer and Heller (1996) report that 95% of cars in America are equipped with radios and that 75% of Americans listen to the radio while in their cars. So-called "drive-time" audiences are essentially captive audiences primed toward hostile responses by the traffic they are dealing with (Fletcher, 1999) . Kolbert (1992) quotes Democratic political consultant Carter Askew on this point: "People listen to the radio in an angry mood, sitting in traffic, as opposed to the escapist mood when they watch TV" (p. A15). Clearly, such would provide a particularly hospitable climate for divisive, negative ads.
18. Two examples of potentially balkanizing radio ads from the 2002 Senate race in Arkansas (one from the Republicans, one from the Democrats) may help illustrate the content and targeting of these sorts of advertisements. A young Republican group ran a series of radio ads on station KNEA in Jonesboro, in the rural northeastern part of Arkansas. KNEA has a sports talk format with a largely young, White, male listenership. These ads were delivered in a voice that sounds like its target audience: young, White, male, and rural. Lau and Pomper (2002) for the virtues of senate races as venues in which to explore campaign effects.
20. Further information about the methodology of the survey may be found in Magleby and Monson (2003) .
21. Although we make no strict claim that the data from our two states represent a crosssection of the wider American public, we suspect our findings are more or less generalizable to the broader public. One race featured a Republican incumbent and a Democratic challenger; in the other, the candidates were reversed. Although Arkansas tends toward the bottom of most socioeconomic rankings of states, Missouri has a demographic profile that closely matches national averages. It is also worth noting that because of data limitations of various sorts, studies with subnational sampling or experimental frames are reasonably common in the literature on political communication (e.g., Ansolabehere, Iyengar, Simon, & Valentino, 1994; Freedman & Goldstein, 1999; Hofstetter, 1998; Hofstetter et al., 1994; Jones, 1998; McCleneghan, 1987) .
22. In addition, the modal respondent reported hearing no radio ads during the course of the survey waves, compared to a modal response of 12 television ads.
23. The scale is based on the sum of respondents' levels of agreement with the following statements: "Public officials don't care much about what people like me think." "People like me don't have any say in what the government does." "Sometimes government and politics seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on."
24. What qualifies as a reasonable adjusted R 2 is a matter of judgment. Although the values we report in this article are not overwhelming in magnitude, they compare well with those seen in other recent studies of media effects (e.g., Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 1998; Newton, 1999; Shah, Kwak, & Holbert, 2001; Uslaner, 2004) , many of which report only raw rather than adjusted R 2 scores. 25. Because partisanship and ideology correlate highly, including both leads to collinearity problems. We opt to include partisanship because it has the most direct political interpretation.
26. Uses and gratification theory would suggest that less well educated and less politically engaged citizens might be drawn to the more tailored political campaign messages found on radio, so we will interpret these coefficients as statistically significant because our hypotheses have implicit directions attached to them. These figures comport with those reported by Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (1998) in their study of the relationship between news sources and attitudes toward Congress.
27. The question was worded as follows:
I'm going to mention several ways that some people receive information about the November elections. For each one that I mention, please tell in general how important and useful it is to you personally in helping you to make up your mind about how to vote. If you have not seen or received information from the source that I mention, please just say so. How about _____________? Is it very important, not too important, or not at all important?
Responses were coded from 1 for (very important) to 5 (no information received from this source). In addition to radio and television ads, the question asked about direct candidate contact, mailings, newspaper stories, e-mail from campaigns, and several other sources. 28. The religiosity variable also generates a coefficient that surpasses the threshold for statistical significance at the .10 threshold in the television model. However, because we hypothesized no direction for this variable in the TV equation, we are reluctant to accept this as compelling evidence of a relationship between religious behavior and perceived importance of television ads in the general public. In contrast, there is clear and compelling evidence of a religious effect in the radio model. Of course, it is quite possible that groups that feel ill-served by the "mainstream media" (men, racial minorities, the young, the less educated) might seek use and gratification from a number of different sources, including television (perhaps especially targeted cable television). The fact that the coefficients for these groups are consistently larger in the radio model than in that for television suggests that although they do not rely solely on radio, they find it a more useful source of information than television.
29. In part, at least, this may reflect an increasing trend for television (especially networks) to aim programming at older viewers, leading younger citizens to seek alternative media sources (Livsey, 2004) .
30. The differences are large enough to deserve special comment. Fully 60% of nonCaucasians responded that radio ads were either "very important" or "somewhat important" for them personally as sources of information about the campaigns, and 70% said the same about TV. Among Caucasians, the numbers were 34% and 45% for radio and television ads, respectively. Caucasian respondents were almost twice as likely (15%) to indicate they received no information from radio ads than were non-Caucasians (8%).
31. Relatedly, the lack of visuals may leave more room for substantive information and prove less distracting. Similarly, Americans may be able to digest more information from radio ads because those who are exposed to them may pay more attention and be less likely to "counter-argue" against what they hear (see Klinger, 1977 Klinger, , 1978 , on the distinction between "respondent attention" and "operant attention"; see also Fiske & Taylor, 1991) . Unlike television, which most viewers see in their homes and watch somewhat passively (e.g., paying less attention during advertisements), Americans tend to listen to radio while driving, when they are a more or less captive audience.
32. Unfortunately, we do not have the data to test this directly, largely because federal rules do not require radio stations to keep campaign advertising records for longer than 2 years. However, the noncompetitive nature of the ads run by radio stations fits our experiences observing the 2002 campaigns, the documented nature of radio niche advertising, and the reports of campaign officials we interviewed regarding the targeted nature of their radio ad campaigns. We are currently engaged in a study of a recent gubernatorial campaign to test this proposition more directly.
33. We get close here to the venerable endogeneity debate in studies of political media, whether exposure to media influences political attitude formation or whether preexisting attitudes drive exposure to certain media (a position best argued by Iyengar & Kinder, 1987) . We are agnostic on this point, although believe that the differential results we see here for radio and television exposure may provide some soft evidence in support of the former position.
34. We see similar disparate results (not reported) for radio and television ads in a broader question related to whether the "quality of election campaigns has declined in recent years." 35. Our result for television is consistent with similar findings (e.g., Ansolabehere, Iyengar, & Simon, 1995) .
36. In this regard, the past may be prologue. As television comes to look more like radio with the continued expansion of cable and satellite TV, the dynamics we observe here may provide a glimpse into the future of political advertising on television.
37. And, indeed, there were examples of both types of ads from the 2002 campaigns in Missouri and Arkansas.
38. In this respect, radio campaign ads also seem to operate much differently from what has been observed with PTR, further emphasizing the need for more research on radio.
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